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AN INCREASED ROLE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION IN ADDRESSING FEDERALISM CONCERNS 
Benton Martin 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB)-seen by 
some as one of the most important pieces of education 
legislation in our nation's history1-is overdue for 
reauthorization. 2 Prior attempts at reauthorization have failed 
due to political controversy surrounding NCLB, 3 particularly 
the extent of the federal role in education.4 One critic has 
1. See, e.f{., Robert A Garda, .Jr., Corning Full Circle: The Journey from Separate 
But 8qual to Separate and Unequal Schools, 2 DUKF: J. CONST. L. & !'UH. Pm;y 1, 32 
(2007) ("The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB") is the most important piece of 
education legislation in the last thirty-five years."). 
2. See Sam Dillon, Experts Say a Rewrite of Nation's Main l~ducation Law Will 
Be Hard This Year, N.Y. TIMF:S, Jan. 29, 2010, at A18 [hereinafter Dillon Hard 
Rewrite], available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/0l/29/education/29child.html 
(discussing the chances for a rewrite of NCLB in 2010). 
:-1. See Sam Dillon, Court Revives Lawsuit Against No Child Left Behind Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, .Jan. 8, 2008, at A18 [hereinafter Dillon Lawsuit], available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01108/education/08child.html (discussing how Congress 
was "stymied by partisan strife over the law's renewal"). In October 2011 another bill 
was introduced that would overhaul the law. See News From THE SENATE HEALTH, 
EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSION COMMITTEE, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDAIW 
EDUCATION REAUTHORIZATION ACT: SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS (2011), available at 
http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/4e915Jf1924d8.pdf. Commentators have do not 
have high hopes that the bill will become law, especially with the upcoming election 
year. See .Joy Resmovits, Harhin-Enzi No Child Left Behind Bill fi'aces Uncertain 
Future, HUFFINGTON PosT, Oct. 27, 2011, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/1 0/27/harkin-enzi-no-child-left_n_J0:15790.html (commenting that there is 
"general belief that a law as sweeping as NCLB is unlikely to be passed after the end of 
2011"); Sam Dillon, Senate Panel Approves Bill That Rewrites Education Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2011, at A9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/10/22/education/22educ.html (reporting that one commentator gave the bill a "50-
50 chance" of passing before the presidential election). 
1. See Dan Lips, Reforming No Child [,eft Behind by Allowing States to Opt Out: 
An A-PLUS for Federalism, HERITAGE FOUND. (,June 19, 2007), www.heritage.org/ 
Research/l{eports/2007/06/Reforming-No-Child-Left-Behind-by-Allowing-States-to-Opt-
Out-An-A-PLUS-for-Federalism (discussing proposals by Republican congressmen to 
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referred to NCLB as "the most intrusive federal education 
legislation in our nation's history."5 NCLB indeed ushered in 
an expansive federal role in education. But whether this role is 
detrimental is debatable. 
Federalism addresses the interaction of state governments 
with the federal government. 6 This interaction often involves 
trade-offs between state and federal power, where courts try to 
draw limits on federal power. 7 But NCLB does not fit squarely 
into lines traditionally drawn. x Through its spending power, 
the federal government is boldly raising its voice in educationY 
The states have all accepted this federal role, incorporating 
federal goals into their own education plans. 10 The courts have 
largely left the issue untouched. 11 The field is thus ripe for new 
theories of federalism. 12 Many theories have emerged, mostly 
in support of a continued federal role. How a refined view of 
federalism should influence legislators looking to reauthorize 
NCLB, however, has not been adequately addressed in the 
literature.n 
allow f(Jr a more limitt,d federal rolt,). 
5. ,James 1~. Ryan. The Perverse lncentiues of the No Child Ll'ft /Jehind Al'f. 79 
N.Y. U. L. l{c,v. 9:!2, 989 (2001). 
G. s('(' MAL<"oLM M. FEI·:u:Y & EllWAiwiWBIN. FEillmAus~t: PouTI<'.\I.IJn:NTITY 
& TIL\(;Ic COJ\11'1(()1\IISE 12-1:l (2008) (dd'ining f(.'deralism). 
7. Hobert. A Schapiro, '!!;ward a Them:v of lntaactive Federalism, 91 low,\ L. 
J{JW. 2•1:), 2-1G-17 (200:0) (discussing tlw traditional "dualist." theory of fl•<h•ralism). 
' /d. at 256 (arguing that the "overall dualist. project of dividing state from federal 
authority providc•s little• guidancl, .. wh<m appliPd t.o NCLB). 
9. See i\.nn McColl, Tough Call: Is No Child IA•ft /Jehind Constitutional'. 8() !'Ill 
DELTA KAPI'.-\:--J 60•1, ()0-1-0fi (2005) (questioning the constitutionality of NCLB, but 
n•cognizing its roots in thl' congrl'ssional spending power). 
10. Kamina i\.liya Pinder, Fedl'ml IJI'mand an l"ocal Choice: Safeg·uardin.~· the 
Notion of Fl'dcralism in l~dumtion Law and Policy. :)g .J.L. & ElllJ('. 1. 27 (2010) ("[i\.jll 
statl•s accl'pted NCLB funds dc'8pit.l' t.lw rl'luctnncP of sonw to do so.'} 
11. Michaul Heise, Thl' l'olitiml l~conomy of !o'ducation l•hlemlisrn, 5() E~JOI~Y 
L .• J. 12fi. 127 (200f)) (noting that while' t.hl'rt' had been Jpgal attacks on NCLB norw had 
succl,eded). One court has now lwld NCLB inconsistent with thl' l't•quin,nwnt.s for thl· 
Spending Claus<', but this opinion addresses only thl' "unfunded mandate•" port ion of 
NCLB and has not yl't. hl'en adoptl•d by othl'l' courts. 8el' Sch. Dist. of l'ontiac v. Sl,c':v of' 
U.S. l)pp't of Educ., 58,1 F.:ld 2fi:l. '277 (6th Cir. 2009) (lb·iding that the fl'dl'ral 
government. could not. require' states to spend tfwir own morwy to achil'Vl' NCLB goals 
lwcausl' if' the i\ct purportc•d to n'quire such action, t.hl' language was ambiguous. in 
violation of the unambiguous rl'quireml'nt of Spending Clause jurisprudc•m·l'). 
12. Schapiro, supra note 7, at. 29:) (arguing "the dualist approach providc•s lit.tlP 
guidancl' in assc'ssing the NCLB [whilt' a m•w thc·or·y ofJ [pjolyphony providl·s at il'ast a 
framl'work for analysis"). 
I :l. See, e.g .. id. at. 28:l (encouraging an approach that gives CongrPss direct 
management on fc'dc,ral-st.ale int.l,ract.ion, but not providing any specific 
n'comml'ndations for changl'S Lo NCLB). 
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This article argues that the traditional institutions for 
addressing federalism concerns-legislative and judicial-are 
inadequate in the education context. Instead, Congress, in 
reauthorizing NCLB, should give greater responsibility to 
administrative agencies, particularly the Department of 
Education (DOE). Part II traces the history of judicial and 
legislative control of federalism concerns. Parts III and IV 
introduce NCLB and the DOE's role in its enforcement. Part V 
addresses new proposals for its reauthorization. Part VI 
highlights novel theories of federalism and applies them to 
NCLB. Part VII argues that agencies must be further engaged 
in balancing state and federal concerns regarding education 
reform. 
II. HISTORY OF FEDERALISM AND EDUCATION LAW 
For the first one hundred years of U.S. history, Congress 
had a limited but active role in education. For example, as 
early as 1785, the federal government required that proceeds 
from the sale of land in the Northwest Territories go to public 
schools. 14 Congress likely operated with self-restraint due to 
pervading views of strong states' rights. 15 As a result, the 
Supreme Court did not strike down a single federal law as 
violating the Commerce Clause or the Tenth Amendment. 16 
Congress's role increased after the ending of the Civil War 
in 1865. 17 The federal government required new Union states 
to provide free public schools and established an early form of 
the Department of Education, 18 though departmental powers 
were limited mainly to collecting and publishing data on the 
state of American education. 19 The Court responded by putting 
limits on congressional power: by 1936 the Court had narrowed 
the scope of Commerce Clause power and had used the Tenth 
Amendment to prohibit even federal taxing and spending 
11. Erik W. !{obelen, The /~valuing Federal Role, in LESSONS OF A CE:--JTURY: A 
NATION'S SCHOOLS COME OF Acm 240 (2000). 
15. See FOIWEST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN 
lMPEWO, 1776-1876 (2000) (describing how many people believed that states could 
nullify unconstitutional federal laws). 
16. ERWIN CHEMEIUNSKY, l~NHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21'' 
CENTURY145~008). 
17. See id. (describing how the Civil War ended defiance to federal power). 
18. l{obelen, supra note 1111, at 210. 
19. ld.at211. 
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power from encroaching into traditionally state activities.20 
Despite the Court's restrictive views, however, Congress 
enacted the 1917 Smith-Hughes Act, which succeeded in 
providing federal aid to schools in the form of grants for 
vocational programs.21 
From the late 1930s to the early 1990s, the Court's 
opposition to congressional power decreased, clearing the way 
for a greater federal role in education. The Court shifted to a 
"nationalist" perspective, rejecting the Tenth Amendment as a 
constraint on federal legislative power and permitting broad 
legislation based on Congress's commerce and spending 
powers.22 The federal role in education indeed expanded: 
Congress provided money for school construction and teacher 
salaries, supported veterans going to college and local school 
districts affected by military mobili1mtion, passed school lunch 
programs, and provided aid for areas affected by federal 
acquisition of property. 23 The Cold War further encouraged 
federal support for math, science, and foreign language 
education to stay competitive with Soviet rivals. 24 
The federal aid, however, tended to favor wealthier school 
districts to the detriment of poorer countryside and urban 
schools.25 To combat these disparities, Congress enacted 
influential federal education legislation, including the 1965 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), the 
precursor of NCLB.26 ESEA dramatically increased federal 
spending on K-12 education and helped the DOE gain 
prominence in setting education policy-as the agency 
administered ESEAY Congress also set the Secretary of 
Education as a cabinet post.2x 
At the same time, the states began creating statewide 
education policies.29 States have always provided, and continue 
20. CHJ·:~n:I\JNt;KY, supra note 16, at 2fi9 n. :l ("Sec e.g .. Carter v. Carter Co;d Co .. 
291-l U.S. 2:lil (1 9:l6) (limiting thL' commL,rce power): UnilL•d States v. ButlL•r. 297 U.S. 1 
(1 \l:Hi) (invalidating spL,nding law for violating thL' TL•nth Anwndnwnt)."). 
21. ]{obelen. supra not.L' 11, at 210. 
22. CHEI\IEHI'lSKY, supm notl' Hi. at Hfi. 
2:l. Hoheil,n. su.pru note 11. at 210-11. 
21. ld. 
25. !d. 
26. See /d. (listing the federal init.iativL's from thL' 1 9fi0s and 1970s). 
27. ld. 
2H. U.S. J)ep't of Educ .. Federal F!ole in l~ducation, ED.<:ov, http://l'd.gov/abouLI 
ovL•rvit•wifL•dlrole.htmJ'isrc=ln (last modifipd Mar. :lO, 2011). 
29. PAUl. :\1!\NNi\, SCIIOOL'S IN: FEIH:IL\LISI'vl ,\'ll> THI•: NXI'IOf\:;\1. EIHiCXI'ION 
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to provide, the majority of the nation's education funding, but 
typically did not have experts and political bodies dedicated to 
education policy until the 1970s.30 Since this time, state 
governments have made strides towards providing equality of 
financing amongst school districts, increasing educational 
quality, and setting standards for student achievement. 31 
The federal position shifted in 1981 when President Reagan 
took office trumpeting the goal of a limited federal 
government.32 Although he managed to slow the increasing 
level of federal spending on education, at least initially, he did 
not otherwise decrease the federal role in education directly.33 
But he did limit the federal role in less-obvious ways. For 
example, he required that executive agencies consider specific 
federalism concerns when formulating policies34 (an order 
revoked by President Clinton35) and, along with President 
Bush, managed to appoint a Supreme Court majority of 
conservatively-inclined justices. These conservative justices 
have abated the increasing role of the federal government in 
education, defending states' rights under the Tenth 
Amendment36 and limiting the scope of the Commerce Clause 
by prohibiting the federal government from regulating the 
states in regards to "noncommercial" activities.37 So as 
Congress continues to increase the federal role in education, 
the Supreme Court has essentially worked against that effort, 
shifting back to a "federalist" perspective, increasingly focused 
on states' rights. 
Although states' rights advocates expected this "federalism 
revolution" to affect Congress's spending power, the Court has 
ACENJJA 10 (2006). 
:lO. ld. 
:n. Jd.at10-11. 
:l2. See J{obelen, supra note 11, at 211 (describing President !{eagan's priority of 
limiting the federal role in education). 
:l:-l. Jd. 
:H. Exec. Order No. 12612, 52 Fed. He g. 11685 (Oct. 26, 1987). 
:l5. Exec. Order No. 1:-108:3, 68 Fed. Reg. 27651 (May 14, 1998), revoked by Exec. 
Order No. 131 :l2 , 64 Fed. He g. 1:l255 (Aug. 1, 1999). 
:16. CHEMEHINSKY, HUpra note 16, at 116. 
:37. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting congressional 
Commerce Clause authority to impose firearm regulation); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (limiting congressional Commerce Clause authority to regulate 
domestic violence); Schapiro, supra note 7, at 247 ("With regard to the key source of 
federal authority, the Interstate Commerce Clause, the United States Supreme Court 
has fastened on to the distinction between 'commercial' and 'noncommercial' activity as 
a defensible boundary for an enclave of exclusive state control."). 
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left this power largely unbridled.3x Even today, the Spending 
Clause remains mostly unconstrained by federalism concerns 39 
resulting in Congress pushing its education policy on states 
primarily by conditioning federal funding on state adherence to 
federal priorities.4° For example, in 1994 Congress passed 
President Clinton's Goals 2000: Educate America Act, which 
focused on using federal aid to assist states in creating their 
own academic achievement standards and assessment 
mechanisms.41 Congress included these types of reforms m 
subsequent reauthorizations of ESEA,42 including NCLB.43 
Ill. KEY PROVISIONS OF NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND 
With NCLB, Congress sought to improve academic 
achievement of all students~but particularly disadvantaged 
students~through increased accountability of public-school 
systems.44 To this end, NCLB requires states, in order to 
receive federal funds, to implement standards-based tests to 
determine annual yearly progress, require teachers to meet 
:JS. See Samuel 1{. BagPnstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the F!oherts Court, 5S 
DUKE L .• J. :J-15 (2001\) (discussing how the ]{phnquist Court left tfw congrPssional 
spending power largely untouched and pn,dicte:d the• Roberts Court ma.v still limit such 
authority). l'mfi.•ssor Bagenstos notes: "Throughout thP J{ehnquist Court's 'fec!t•ralism 
n•volution,' as tlw Court cut back on federal power unde'r Article• I and tlw Civil Wm· 
AmendmPnts, many commentators nssprte:d that the sJwnding powpr was nc•xt to go on 
tfll' chopping block. The: SJJl'nding power seemed to offer Congress a way to circumvent 
the limitations the Court had imposed on the other le:gislative: powe•rs .... To deofl'nckrs 
of states' rights, Llll' spending power now se:emed '[t]he: grl'atest threat to statl' 
autonomy,' and was thus likcdy to be• Llw rwxt front in Llll' l'ede:ralism rl'volution .... In 
tlw end. the He:hnquist Court nevpr got around to limiting Congrl'ss's powe•r unde•r tlw 
Spc•nding Clause.'' !d. at :Hfi-·1S. 
:m See id. at :J-19-50 ("'n its first two significant case•s addressing Llw scope• of 
fedpral power---cases that ruled (narrowly) in favor of feckral abrogations of state• 
sovc•reign immunity-the !{obe•rts Court see:nwd to follow the sanw nonrl'volutionary 
line: as did the: late: lh:hnquist Court. Onl' might. thl'rdon•, expPet tlw !{ohl'rts Court 
also to be charitable• about Congrc:ss's exercise of tlw spending powe•r."). 
10. Not only is this thl' nwthod use•d for NCLB, but also fi>r thl' ne•we•r !{ace: to tlw 
Top Program, which provides awards to state:s that dl've:lop Uw lll'st l'ducation plans 
according to pre-established measuring standards. 8ec generully U.S. DI·:I''T 01·' ElllJ(' .. 
RACE TO 'I'HI•: '1'01' I'IWW(M1: EXECUTIVI•: SUMMi\I{Y (Nov. 2009) [hc•reinaftpr ]{i\('1•: TO 
'I'H 1·: T<ll' !'!{()(; IL\M], auailahlc at http://www2.c,d.gov/programs/racl'tothe:top/exc:cu tive•-
summary.pdf (summarizing tlw !{ace• to the Top program). 
·11. Robl'len. supra note 1·1. at 211. 
12. /d. 
1:l. Sec Wayne C. !{iddlc' & Rl'bc:cca It Skinm•r, The /.;lcmentar.v and Secondary 
r;dumtion Act, as Amended by the No Child /,eft /Jehind Act: A l'ri111er, in ;o.Jo CIIILil 
LEFT BEHIND: lSSLII•:SANIJ DIWELOI'~H:NTS 1-\,1 (!'au] H. llerkhart e:d., 2001-1). 
1·1. /d. 
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specific qualifications, and shut down schools not meeting 
annual benchmarks.45 Funding is distributed using four 
different formulas, all of which primarily consider state 
expenditures on students and the number of students from 
poor families. 46 NCLB also grants funding for specific 
programs: drug-abuse prevention, impact aid, teacher 
development, and instruction for limited English proficiency.47 
This part of the article examines NCLB's key features in more 
detail. 
A. Standards-Based Assessments and AYP Determinations 
According to President George W. Bush, annual testing 
administered by states is the "cornerstone" of NCLB, allowing 
state control and flexibility. 48 States annually test students in 
grades 3 to 8 in mathematics and reading or language arts49 
and do so once more during grades 10 to 12.50 States also test 
students in science annually. 51 The results of these tests place 
students in one of three categories: advanced, proficient, or 
basic. 52 The states also must administer a national test-the 
National Assessment of Educational Progress-to 4th and 8th 
grade students. 53 
States must use the results from these tests to determine 
whether schools and school districts are making "adequate 
yearly progress."54 This determination is complex and 
increasingly guided by the federal government, and this 
requirement applies to all public schools, local educational 
authorities, and the state overall. 55 In addition, states must try 
to get all students testing at proficient or advanced levels by 
2014. 56 The federal government allows a limited number of 
states to use an experimental "growth" model for calculating 
15. /d. 
4G. ld. at 8fi. 
17. ld. at 81. 
18. MANNA, supra notP 29, at 119. 
19. 20 U.S.C. § G:111(b)(:1)(C)(v)(l) (2011). 
50. /d. 
51. !d. at§ Klll (h)(il)(C)(v)(II). 
52. !d. at§ G:lll(h)(2)(C). 
5il. /d. at§ 6311 (c)(2). 
51. !d. at§ G:lll (b)(2)(B). 
55. PAUL H. BEltKHAI{'I', NO CHJLD LEFT BEHIND: iSSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS viii 
(Paul H. Berkhart ed., 2008). 
56. /d. 
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yearly progress.57 
As the federal government discovered, pressing states 
toward overall national progress presents unique challenges. It 
was difficult to account for variations in fifty different schools 
systems and student populations. 5x Some states protested that 
they would have to use their own resources59 to implement the 
requirements of NCLB since federal funds made up only about 
7%> of the total education bill. 60 Additionally, it also proved a 
challenge to seek academic improvement in the nation's 
students as a whole while targeting disadvantaged and 
minority students. 61 Tracking the progress of various groups 
met this challenge theoretically, but federal officials had to 
spend time fine-tuning the formula. 62 Federal officials also had 
to balance enforcement of NCLB with the desire to have it 
widely accepted by the states-to the point of issuing multiple 
revisions and policy updates. 63 Now that all states have 
accepted NCLB, the DOE has penalized multiple states for 
failing to meet its requirements.64 
57. See l{idrlle & Skinner, supra note 1:l. at ~7 ("In n•cent yem·s. then• has been 
increasing inturpst in using 'growth' models to dett,rmine 1\ Yl', by· which tlw 
achievt•ment. of individual pupils is tracked from year to yt•ar."). Becausl' of the growing 
populm·ity of this approach, "[u]nder a pilot program, a limited numbt•r of statt•s an• 
hl'ing allowerl to use such models." /d. 
5R M,\:-.JN,\, supra note 29. at 122. 
59. !d. (describing the difficultit:s faced by thl' draftl:rs of NCLB). 
(iO. /d. at 121, 1:l2 (discussing how NCLB puts high capacity dt•mands on states 
and Virginia's pi'Otest to tht• "sweeping intrusion" of the fl,deral govl:rnml:nt that would 
"ovc•rwhelm Virginia's flnances and throw tlw state from progn:ss it had aln•ady madl' 
on incn•asing student achievl'ment."). 
(il. !d. at 121. 
62. See id. at 125 (dt,scribing how the original 1\ Yl' formula inal'l'llnttely lalll•bl 
successful schools as failun•s ). 
():l. /d. at J:l-1-:l:) (dl'scribing how !'resident Bush and tht: St•crdary of Education 
praist•d statl:s and issul'd policy revisions wlwn states Wl'n' failing to nwd 
requin:nwnts under thP Act, in ordt•r to maintain tlw ability to purstw t.lwir agc•nda). 
(i•l. Sec .Janet Y. Thomas & Kevin 1'. Brady, The l~lementwy and Secondury 
/~dum/ion Act at 10: l~quity, Accountability, and the l~volving f•(,dcml Role in l'ublic 
}<;ducation. 29 ]{EV. HJ>:S. EIHH'i\'t'ION G 1, (i 1 (2005) (dl'Sl'l'ihing situations whl•n• t lw 
Department of Education has ptmalized statl's financially for failing to nwl't ;\JCLB 
n•quirernents). In 200:). Professors .Janet Thomas and Kevin Brady n·counted th(' 
f(Jl!owing l'Xamples: ''Georgin had its funding reducl:d hy :ji7l~,:lOO for failing to align 
its high school (pst with state content standards . . That same year. M inrwsota's 
administrative budget was cut hecausl: it. uspd attendancP n'cords ratlwr than tlw 
n•quin·d tl':;t scores to report 1\ Yl' .... In 200G Texas lost almost half' a million dollars 
in administrative support for failing to notify parents that tht•ir childn·n had thl' right 
to transfer from failing schools .... Thl' District of Columbia is facing a 25",., decn'aSl' 
in aid for failing to mateh standardizPd testing to acadl•mic JWrformnncl' standards." 
/d. (internal citations omittl•d). 
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B. Teacher Qualifications 
States must require public school teachers to be "highly 
qualified" in core subjects.65 This means they must possess a 
bachelor's degree, state certification or equivalent, a license to 
teach, and demonstrate competence in the subject they teach.66 
Critics argued that this standard was overly stringent, 
provoking the DOE to issue revisions and flexibility provisions 
for groups like rural schools and multi-subject teachers.67 
Critics also continue to complain that the requirements do not 
take actual student achievement into account. 68 
C. Shutting Down Schools Failing to Meet A YP 
In addition to guidelines for student achievement and 
teacher qualifications, NCLB mandates how states must 
handle failing schools receiving federal funding. 69 If a school 
does not make adequate progress for two consecutive years, 
then that school's students must be given the option to attend a 
school that is meeting NCLB standards. 70 If progress isn't 
made after three consecutive years, the state must offer 
supplemental educational services (from a parent-selected 
provider "with a demonstrated record of effectiveness") to low-
income students at the schooP 1 After four consecutive years, 
the school must take one or more "corrective actions" mandated 
by statute. 72 A year after taking one of these corrective 
65. 20 U.S.C. § 6:119(a)(1) (2006). 
66. Riddle & Skinner, supra note 1a, at 87. 
67. S!'!' MANNA, supra note 29, at 1 :H<l5 (describing pressures causing the 
Department of Education to revise the teacher qualification standards); see also U.S. 
Dep't of Educ., New No Child L!'(t Behind Flexibility: Hi!Jhly Qualified Teachers Fact 
Sheet, ED.(;ov (Mar. 2001), http://www2.cd.gov/nclb/mcthods/tcachers/ 
hqtflexibility.html (discussing flexibility in meeting "highly qualified" requirement). 
68. S!'e Sam Dillon, Obama to Seek Sweepin!J Chan!Je in 'No Child' Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at Al [hereinafter Dillon Changes], available at 
h ttp:l /www .n yti mes.com/20 1 0/02/01/ educa tion/0 1 child. h tm]'/pagewanted=all 
(describing criticisms and new proposals regarding teacher qualifications). 
69. See 20 U.S.C. § 6:116(b) (2006); BERKHAI<T, supra note 55, at viii. Here, 
"failing" means failure to meet AYP. Also, it should be noted that around 94% of all 
local educational entities receivt; funds through NCLB. McColl, supra note 9, at 609. 
70. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b) (2011). 
71. /d. at§ 6:l16(b)(S)(B)(iii) & (e)(l). 
72. !d. at § 6316(b)(7)(C)(iv). The options are as follows: "(i) l{cplace the school 
staff who arc relevant to the failure to make adequate yearly progress. (ii) Institute 
and fully implement a new curriculum, including providing appropriate professional 
development for all relevant staff, that is based on scientifically based research and 
offers substantial promise of improving educational achievement for low-achieving 
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actions, 73 the school must implement a plan for "alternate 
governance" that fits within one of five specified 
arrangements.74 Although even cr1t1cs agree that failing 
schools must be identified and improved, 75 they challenge these 
requirements as incomplete and overly restrictive. 76 They 
argue that the requirements resulted more from political 
compromise than from a fair assessment of the best way to 
improve failing schools. 77 
students and l'nabling the school to makp adt,quatP yearly progn'ss. (iii) Significantlv 
decrease managL,ment authority at the school levPI. (iv) Appoint an outsidl· l'Xlll'rt to 
advise the school on its progress toward making adequatP yt•arly progrPss (v) 
Extpnd the school year or school day f(>r the school. (vi) J{pstructurP tlw intl'rnal 
organizational structure of the school." !d. 
7:1. The local education agency can delay correctivl' actions for a year, bringing 
the total time failing to meet i\ YP up to six ypars. Sec id. at~ 6:1Hi(h)(7)(D). 
7·1. !d. at ~ ();)] G(h)(8)(B). The arrangemPnts include: "(i) f{porwning the school as 
a public charter school. (ii) Replacing all or most of the school staff (which may includl' 
tlw principal) who an' reJL,vant to the failure to makP adequate yt'arly progrPss. (iii) 
Entering into a contract with an entity, sueh as a private management company. with 
a <kmonstrated record of dlectivl"wss, to operate tlw public school. (iv) Turning thl' 
operation of t.hl' school over to the St.atl' educational agPncy. if rwnnittPd unrll't' StatP 
law and agrPPd to by the State. (v) i\ny othPr major t·pstructuring of the school's 
govurnanep arrangetnent that n1akes fundan1ental refonns, such as signifi('ant changPs 
in the school's staffing and governance. to improve studL•nt. academic achiPvPmPnt in 
thP school and that has substantial pr-omisl' of enabling thl' school to makP adPquate 
yearly progress ... . "!d. 
7G. See Editorial, Lesson for Failing Schools, N.Y. TII\1\<:S, ,July 6, 2009, at A1H, 
available at http://www.nytimt•s.com/2009/07/()()/opinion/()()monl.html (supporting 
Sucrdary of Education i\rne Duncan's comnwnts that statl" should t.akl' bold action on 
failing schools). 
7(). Sec !{0:-.J,\Lil C. BIV\IlY, THOIVI.\S B. FOIWH.\M FOlJN!li\TION. C.\N F.\11.1:-.JC 
SCIHJOLS Ill<: FIX!m'! :l0-:l:1 (.Jan. 200:1). cwailuh/e ut 
http://www.l'ric.Pd.gov/I'IWSII~D19H798.pdf (arguing that no orw inll•rvention stratcg,· 
yil~lds a succl'SS rate of greatm· than 50%. and that policymakPrs should considt'r 
additional options f(,r improving education ... ); Claudia Sanclwz, State Stmg~;lc W1:til 
Next Step for Failing Schools, :-.JI'I{ (FPb. 22, 2006), uuailahle ut 
http://www.npr.org/tpmplatcs/story/story.php'1storyld=522HG:l0 (highlighting thl' fact 
that NCLB does not address what should happen wlwn a school fails for the sixth 
consecutive year in a row); Elissa Coolman, N•wcr City Students Seclc Trcwsj(•rs /o 
!Jetter Schools, N.Y. T!MJ<:S, Oct. Hi. 20(J1, at ll:l. cwuilable at 
http://www.nytimPs.com/20(H/1 0/15/t,ducat.ion/1 Gschool.ht.ml (noting prob!Pms with 
implenwnting thl' NCLB provisions regarding school transf(•r). 
77. Sec Lizettu i\lvan•z, Senators Are Nearing Compromisc on Rescuing Failing 
Schools, N.Y. TIIVH:s. i\pr. S. 2001, at SPc. 1, 2:l. cwailablc ut 
http://www .nyti nH •s.com/200 1 /01108/ us/ sen a tors-an~-1wa ring-com prom i Sl' -on-n·scu in g-
failing-schools.html (implying that !{epublican vil,WS on vouchers may have• int1m·nced 
school choice provisions): Lizdtl' Alvan,z, Senate !'asses /Jill for Ann uul 'f(,sts in l'ublic 
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, ,Jmw 1 G. 2001. at i\ 1. auailahle at 
h t. tp :1 /www. nyti m es.com/200 1 /()()/ 1 5/u s/ Sl' na tl'- passes-b iII- for-ann ua I- tests-in-pub I ic-
schools.htmJ'>pagewantpd=all&src=pm (discussing how both DL•mocrats and 
!{ppublicans bad to compromise isstws in order to pass thP S(•nate version of NCLB). 
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IV. ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
Although NCLB expanded the DOE's position as a national 
standard setter, early setbacks caused Congress to limit DOE 
enforcement. 78 Prior to NCLB, the DOE dispersed federal 
funds, offered assistance, and attempted to encourage state 
compliance, but the agency did not impose negative 
consequences on states for not complying with achievement 
standards. 79 The DOE now monitors and enforces progress 
requirements, teacher qualification, and failing-school 
consequences. 80 Additionally, Congress gave the DOE an 
integral position in facilitating federalism by giving it the 
power to grant waivers to states. 81 Meant to encourage states 
to try new methods of achievement,82 states mainly sought 
waivers when unable to meet yearly progress requirements.83 
This has led to allegations that waivers dilute accountability 
standards. 84 
Initial enforcement by the DOE proved a bumpy road. For 
example, although President Bush and Congress instructed the 
DOE to strictly enforce the Reading First program, allegations 
soon arose that the agency, by influencing school reading 
curriculum, had violated a federal law85 that prohibits it from 
supervising or controlling local curriculum. 86 This provision 
puts the DOE in a tough spot: entrusted with enforcing federal 
policy in local schools but prohibited from influencing their 
78. Pinder, supra note 10, at 29. 
79. See id. at 1 ~3 (discussing the pre-NCLB DOE). 
80. Jd. at 15 (discussing the effect of NCLB on DOE). 
81. 20 U.S.C. § 7861 (2011). 
82. See Kristina 1'. Doan, No Child Left Behind Waivers: A Lesson in Federal 
Flexibility or Regulatory Failure?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 211, 216-18 (2008) (discussing the 
momentum leading to the decision to allow NCLB waivers). 
8:3. See Garda, supra note 1, at 70 (discussing how states have used waivers to 
dilute their A YP requirements). 
84. See, e.g., Pinder, supra note 10, at 85 ("many states have used loopholes and 
waivers to dilute the impact of NCLB's accountability provisions."). 
85. ld. at 16 (citing OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE 
READING FIRST PROGRAM'S GRANT APPLICATION PROCESS 6-26 (2006)). 
86. 20 U.S.C. § 340:3(b) (2011). The full provision states that: "No provision of a 
program administered by the Secretary or by any other officer of the Department shall 
be construed to authorize the Secretary or any such officer to exercise any direction, 
supervision, or control over the curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or 
personnel of any educational institution, school, or school system, over any accrediting 
agency or association, or over the selection or content of library resources, textbooks, or 
other instructional materials by any educational institution or school system, except to 
the extent authorized by law." Jd. 
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curriculum. K7 The backlash from the Reading First program 
undermined one of the keys for NCLB's success-strict state 
accountability-contributing to NCLB's failure to live up to its 
promise of improving academic achievement.K~ 
V. THE 0BAMA ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED CHANGES TO 
NCLB 
The Obama administration has proposed wide-ranging 
changes to NCLB.~9 These changes include increasing state 
competition for federal funds, eliminating the 2014 deadline for 
student proficiency, and replacing the current progress 
requirements with a new goal of creating "college-and career-
ready" students. 90 The proposal preserves the analysis of 
demographic groupsY 1 Schools showing improvement would he 
rewarded.92 The National Governors Association is already 
coordinating an effort, joined by over 40 states, to write 
common standards to define "college- and career-ready."93 
The proposed changes seek to respond to key objections 
from educators. Instead of focusing solely on funding districts 
based on their proportion of poor students, the administration 
wants to reward academic progress. 94 Instead of schools 
claiming entitlement to funds, it will give funds to schools that 
87. See Pindur, supra note 10, at ](j ("Thl' rPport and its political afternwth ll'ft 
thl' Department with conflicting messages of how to mel't its obligation to Pnforcl' the 
pn•scriptive curricular requin•nwnts of scientifically-basl"l res('arch within the 
parameters of the statutory prohibitions against the h•deral govprnnwnt from 
influencing or din~cting statl' and local curricula."). 
1-\8. Professor Pinder suggests: TI'Jiw backlash against fpderal pnforcenwnt of 
NCLB's accountability measurPs has been so strong that Congn~ss responded h:-· 
restricting the Depat·tmunt of Education's ability to d'f('ctively Pnf(,rct' the rigorous 
requirements of NCLB. This expandPd fedt•ral role not only failed to bring about 
discernible successful academic rPsults, it weak('ned tlw very qualities that held much 
of NCLB's potential for success." /d. at 29. 
89. See f)i/lon Changes. supra note 61-\ (describing the proposed changes. as 
described in a policy docum('nt discussing the 2011 Department of Education budgd). 
90. St'c U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., i\ BLUEI'J{JN'I' Fcm IWFOJ(M: THE i{J·:.\UTHOJ<IZATIOt--: 
OF THE ELEME:'>JT!\J{Y ANJJ SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT :l (Mar. 201 0) jhen~inafter 
BJ.UJ·:J'RINTj, available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/(,lseciiPgiblueprint/blueprint.pdf 
(discussing the goal of '"college and carPer n~ady"). 
91. See Oillon Changes, supra note ()8 (summarizing Obama's proposal for NCLB 
reauthorization). 
92. BLUJ•:I'J{JN'I', supra noU' 90. at. 9 (discussing the goal of '"college and carepr 
ready'} 
9:l. Dillon Changt's, supra note 68. 
91. BLLH:I'JUNT. supra note 90, at. 9. 
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promise greater reform, similar to the Race to the Top 
Program, which is viewed as a success. 95 Instead of branding 
schools as failing, 96 the administration hopes it can approach 
accountability in a more nuanced way, differentiating between 
good schools that are dealing effectively with low-scoring 
students and schools with high-performing students that may 
be neglecting low-scoring students.97 The administration is 
avoiding talk of merit pay, which helped derail the attempted 
2007 rewrite of NCLB, but the new effort may use student 
achievement as a benchmark for teacher qualification.98 A 
Senate panel recently approved a bill that adopts the general 
contours of this approach.99 
VI. APPLYING THEORIES OF FEDERALISM TO NCLB 
Under a conventional viewpoint of federalism, NCLB is a 
federal encroachment into a traditionally state realm. 100 But 
the federal role in education shows no signs of decreasing, so 
new theories are needed to explain and analyze this unique 
federal and state collaboration. 101 
95. !d. at :l6 (discussing how the new proposal is modeled after Race to the Top). 
See RN:E TO THE TOP PROGRAM, supra note 10. 
96. See Arne Duncan, Reauthorization of ESEA: Why We Can't Wait, Remarks at 
the Monthly Stakeholders Meeting (Sept. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/news/speeches/2009/09/09242009.html ("' also agree with some 
NCLB critics: the law was underfunded-it unfairly labeled many schools as failures 
even when thc'Y were making progress-it places too much emphasis on raw test scores 
rather than student growth-and it is ovc,rly prescriptive in some ways while it is too 
blunt an instrument of ref(Jrm in others."). 
97. See /Jillon Chanf{es, supra note 68 (discussing the administration's hopes for a 
new accountability standard). 
98. BLUEPRINT, supra note 90, at 1 ("We arc calling on states and districts to 
develop and implement systems of teacher and principal evaluation and support, and 
to identify effective and highly effective teachers and principals on the basis of student 
growth and other factors."); Dillon Chanues, supra note 68 (discussing the opposition to 
merit pay). 
99. See News From THE SENATE HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSION 
COMMITTEE, l~LEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION REAUTHORIZATION ACT: 
SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS (2011), available at http://harkin.senate.gov/ 
documents/pdf/1e9151 f1921d:1.pdf. 
100. See Donald C. Orlich, No Child /,eft Behind: An Illogical Accountability 
Model, 78 CLEARING HOUSE 6, 7 (2004) ("This new federalism lexperienced through 
NCLBJ encroaches on states' rights, as guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment."). 
101. See Schapiro, supra note 7, at 256 n.48 and accompanying text (discussing 
how the arguments that NCLB "are quite weak and serve to emphasize how the 
current doctrines of dualist federalism do not provide a useful vocabulary for discussing 
real contemporary issues of federalism."); Gail L. Sunderman, The Federal Role in 
Education: From the Reagan to the Obama Administration, 21 VOICES U!W. Euuc. 6, 
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NCLB could just be a sign that federalism is obsolete in 
America. This contention has been made by Professors Malcolm 
Feeley and Edward Rubin, who suggest that federalism is 
merely a tool for political compromise. 102 According to them, 
America now has a strong national identity and the states do 
not hold strong distinct values, so federalism is no longer 
necessary. 103 Although they recognize federalism won't 
disappear any time soon, 104 Feeley and Rubin suggest that 
education is an area where national standards may be 
particularly appropriate, as highlighted by the recent initiative 
of the National Governors Association to establish uniform 
national education standards. 105 Feeley and Rubin point out 
that people promoting "state rights" often use federalism 
arguments to obscure their true objectives-whether they arc 
preserving parental control, promoting school experimentation, 
or avoiding federal bureaucracy-when it would be better to 
debate these underlying policies directly. 10h 
Instead of arguing federalism is obsolete, Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky argues for an augmented theory of federalism as 
empowerment. 107 He contends that the genius of federalism is 
giving multiple actors power to address society's ills. 10s He 
suggests that federal and state governments should vigorously 
and simultaneously try to reform education, with little 
J:l (200!1) ("By all indications. the Obama administration will continup <·xpanding thl' 
federal role in education."). 
102. FI•:I·:LI•:Y & l{lll\1:-.1. supra note (). at 1 :)2-fi:l (summarizing tlw author's view or 
f<•deralism and how it is "wstigial in the U nit.ed StaL<•s'} 
1 O:l. /d. at 152. l'roressors F'"'"'Y and !{ubin not<' that: "The situation now is that 
th<• United States has a highly integrated culturl'. and most or its citiz<•ns id<•ntif\ 
strongly as Americans. !{<•gional diffpn•ncl'S l'xist and arl' occasionally cl'kbrated, but 
they are trivial in comparison with tlw divisions that exist in other nations. As a restdt. 
federalism is vestigial in the United StaLl'S. It is a histOl'ical nwmory that no long<•r 
serves any political purposl', and it is thus available for manipulation by forcl's that 
opposl' each otlwr with resJwct to issm•s that, unlike fl'd<·ralism itsdf. JWopk rl'ally 
can: about." !d. 
101. !d. at H!cl, 152-G:l. 
lOG. See David .J. Hoff. National Standards Gain 8tewn: Goucrnors' Support 
Hooted in Concerns oucr Competition, EIHICATION Mxrn;m-; (S<•pt. 200!1), auuilable at 
http://www .aaet<•ach<:rs.org/m:wsldtersisl'ptrwwsO!cl. pdf (discussing t lw N a tiona I 
Governors Association emlrt to cn·at<· national standards). 
106. See FI•;ELI-:Y & IWBI:-.1, supru note G. at I Hi-17 (discussing how f(•deralism is 
ust:d as a political tool rath"r than for its merits). 
107. See CHEMI·:I{JNSKY, supra note Hi. at 2,1()-,17 (arguing that the Court should 
em brae<: a m·w theory of federalism). 
101·\. /d. at. 11()-,17. 
1] ADDRESSING FEDERALISM CONCERNS 93 
restraint from courts. 109 He also argues that, to empower 
states, the preemption doctrine should be applied only in 
circumstances where the federal government expressly 
preempts state law. 110 Although this theory appears to be 
broader than the Supreme Court's current stance on federal 
power, it is less radical than the theory that federalism is 
obsolete altogether. 111 
Similar to Chemerinsky, Professor Robert Schapiro argues 
for a "polyphonic" approach to federalism. 112 Since the federal 
and state governments cannot take away each other's authority 
to create law, these governments "represent independent voices 
of authority." 113 Schapiro describes this interaction as 
"polyphony"-when both federal and state governments can 
voice their independent ideas and concerns on education law 
and policy. 114 He criticizes Chemerinsky's theory for having 
"nothing to say about the No Child Left Behind Act, other than 
that courts should keep their hands off it." 115 In contrast, 
polyphonic federalism, he argues, provides "at least a 
framework" for analyzing NCLB. 116 As a "joint state-federal 
effort to improve education," 117 he says, NCLB fosters more 
accountability of education policy set solely by states. 118 
Schapiro acknowledges, however, that his "analysis rests to 
109. Jd. 
110. ld. at 158. 
111. ld. at 21G. 
112. 8ce I{OBJ<:R'I' A SCHJ\I'II((), l'OLYI'HONIC' FEDEHALISM: TOWARD Tim 
PI\O'I'ECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009) (proposing this new theory of 
federalism). 
11:l. Schapiro, supra note 7, at 218-19. 
111. Professor Schapiro describes the concept of polyphony, by discussing the 
following: "[I'Jolyphony ... emphasizes multiplicity. Polyphony entails many voices .... 
'It may be useful to draw an analogy between the development of law, so conceived, and 
the development of music. From the eleventh and twelfth centuries on, monophonic 
music, reflected chiefly in thl' Gregorian chant, was gradually supplanted by 
polyphonic styles.' [Professor Harold Berman] not[es] the significance of plurality in 
Western legal culture. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty has similarly found polyphony to be a 
useful concept for evoking political pluralism. Polyphony thus highlights the key 
features of federalism. It shifts the focus away from dualism's concern with protecting 
state or federal turf. Instead, federalism is about the interaction of multiple 
independent voices. These characteristics allow a polyphonic conception to avoid the 
trap of dualism, while still reaping the benefits of federalism." ld. at 95 (quoting 
HAHOL!l ,J. BERMAN, LAW /\Nil REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTEHN LEGAL 
'l'RAiliTION 7 (198a)). 
115. !d. at 90. 
116. ld. at 10:3. 
117. Jd. 
118. !d. 
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some extent on an optimistic account of NCLB," 119 and he 
never recommends how NCLB should change when 
reauthorized. The changes he does propose~limiting 
preemption doctrine and using our dual court system to protect 
fundamental rights 120~would have little effect on NCLB 
because of the liberal judicial approach to the Spending Clause 
and the lack of a federal right to education. 121 
Finally, NCLB could be viewed through the lens of 
Professor Gillian Metzger's work. She argues that, because the 
administrative state necessarily intersects with federalism 
concerns, administrative law is useful to states and courts in 
addressing these concerns. 122 For example, states have used 
traditional agency procedures to challenge the rationality of 
agency decisionmaking. 123 And the Supreme Court has used 
administrative law to address federalism by applying unique 
standing rules and heightened substantive scrutiny when 
analyzing agency action challenged by states. 124 Metzger 
argues that agencies are particularly responsive to states 
because regional offices give agencies a closer connection to 
states and state implementation ensures that agencies account 
for their interests. 125 Additionally, agencies safeguard state 
interests because their rulemaking guidelines require review of 
state input in a way that ad hoc litigation does not; agencies 
are subject to judicial review; and agencies can review state 
concerns on an ongoing basis. 126 As discussed in the next 
section, Metzger's proposal holds promise in increasing the 
"polyphony" of NCLB because administrative law might 
provide the perfect stage for state and federal government to 
raise their voices on education policy. 
119. !d. at 1 01. 
1~0. Schapiro. supra notP 7. at ~91-9ti. 
1 ~1. Federal law doe~ not recognizP a ft><h,.·al right. to Pducation. See San Antonio 
lndPp. Sch. Dist. v. l{odriguez, "111 U.S. 1 (197:l) (dPnying a pdition to n•cognize a 
federal right. to education). 
1~~. Gillian E. Metzger. 1\dministmtiue /,uw as the New !•hlem/ism, G7 DUKE L .• J. 
202:1 (~OOH). 
1 ~:1. !d. at ~05G-fi0. 
1 ~"1. !d. at. 20():1-65. 
12i'i. !d. at ~071-7i'i. 
12G. /d. at ~077 -()~. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NCLB REAUTHOIUZATION 
The theories above support one argument: the federal 
government should continue to take a role in education, but the 
traditional mechanism for accountability-the courts and 
detailed congressional legislation-are inadequate in 
addressing the federalism concerns raised by education reform. 
The courts currently do not put meaningful constraints on 
NCLB, 127 and proposals to modify this approach are 
unworkable 12x and would decrease polyphony by unnecessarily 
cabining federal involvement. 129 Protecting federalism concerns 
in education reform requires a nuanced approach. When 
Congress updates NCLB, it should establish mechanisms for 
ongoing reform by granting greater authority to the 
Department of Education, rather than by setting out detailed 
new policies. 
A. Shortcomings of the Current Approach 
First, a word on the shortcomings of the current approach, 
which is both too monophonically federal and too hard to adjust 
as new educational approaches are developed. Although states 
127. See Schapiro. supra note 7, at 256 n.48 (discussing how the arguments that 
NCLB is unmnstitutional "under the lenilmt standards ... [of] South Dakota v. Dole, 
18:i U.S. 20:l (1987)" are "quite weak") (citing TASK FORCE ON No CH!Lil LEFT B~:H!Nil, 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LECiiSLATUIU:S, FINAL REPORT 7 (2005) (alleging 
NCLB is unconstitutional)); Heise, supra note 11, at 1:l5<l6 ("The traditional 
mechanism for the rPsolution of such policy turf disputes [hetween local, state, and 
federal interests in education policyJ-judicial enforcpment of federalism boundaries-
is noticeably absent where the federal government seeks to influence policy through 
Congress's conditional spending authority .... "). 
128. Sec .Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Conditions: 
Federalism and Individual ilif{hts, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 160, 161 (1995) ("The 
Court has bePn hesitant to impose marked limits on the Congressional spending power 
because it has adopted the Hamiltonian view that the spending power is an 
independent power."). Likewise, Professor Heise notes that NCLB will likely not be 
Sl,en as coercive because "[cjourts have permitted conditional spending programs where 
the federal funding at issue is so large that a state had 'no choice' but to submit to 
fL,deral policy. In contrast, the burden of the condition imposed by NCLB pales by 
comparison. To be sure, $12.7 billion is a lot of money and, not surprisingly, Title I 
funding is important to all states and most school districts. But state and local-not 
federal-agencies shoulder the overwhelming bulk of the school finance load." Heise, 
supra note 11, at 1 :l8. 
129. See Anthony Consiglio, Nervous Lauuhter and the High Cost of Equality: 
Rcnewinf{ "No Child Left Behind" Will Safef{uard a Vibrant Federalism and a Path 
Toward l~du.cational Excellence, 2009 BYU EDUC. & L.J. ::165, :169 (arguing that 
proposals to invalidate federal involvement in education policies fail because they do 
not point the way forward, but rely on the same mechanisms that did not work before). 
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set the standards for measuring yearly progress, Congress 
explicitly set the consequences for failing to meet those 
standards. 130 This setup produces an incentive for states to 
lower their standards to avoid failure. 131 Purely federal 
standards have been suggested, 132 hut NCLB is already a 
"monstrously complex statute."'-'-' Setting uniform standards 
by statute hinders state experimentation and further 
complicates the law. The federal government must find a way 
to account for diverse state initiatives and allow states to have 
their voices heard in setting national education policy. 
Especially when using the spending power, the primary 
restraint on federal involvement is the political process. 134 
Some scholars suggest the political process sufficiently protects 
federalism concerns, but this theory doesn't work in practice; 
Congress did not give meaningful thought to state interests in 
adopting NCLB. m Republicans wanted to support President 
Bush in his first major domestic policy initiative, 136 and with 
the parties aligned, lobbyists for state interests were 
"intentionally frozen out." 137 The political process, then. 
safeguards polyphony only when it will reap political 
rewards. 1 -'~ 
NCLB is also unresponsive to ongoing state concerns. One 
of the only ways for states to challenge federal education 
policies is to sue the DOE for misapplying NCLB. 139 The City of 
Pontiac in fact succeeded in convincing the Sixth Circuit that 
1 :lO. See supra !'art 11./\-C (discussing th<' specifics of NCLB). 
1 :n. i{yan, supm noll- G. at 9i-IK-H9. 
1:t1. !d. at 91-17-HH (arguing that if states cannot be trusted, tlwn tlw fe<kral 
governnwnt should set standards). 
1 :l:l. /Jill on /lard /{unite. supra not<· 2 (quoting Ch<·st<•r K Finn, .Jr .. an assistant 
se<Tdary ofl'ducation in the !{eagan administration). 
1:l•1. The Note, No Child /,eft fichind und the l'ohlical Suji•guurds of Fedcrulism. 
119 HAI\V. L. I{EV. i-\:-1:). :-191 (200fi) ("i\s a n•sult of the Suprenw Court's d<•cision in 
South Dakota v. Doll', political safeguards are particularly important for federal 
sp<•ruling legislation."). 
1:l5. See id. at :-190, H9:l (discussing Professor lh•rlwrt Wc•chsler's argunwnt that 
the political proc<•ss guanl<•d fl'd<•ralism, but noting that acting fech,ral legislators 
seemed "indifferent" to federalism concerns during the n·authorization that produced 
NCLB). 
1 :lG. !d. at l:l9:J. 
1:l7. !d. 
1 :m. !d. at 902 ("Although the federal govt•mmPnt may not always act to 
aggrandize pow<'r from tlw stat<•s. it will do so when the intrusion will n•ap political 
capital."). 
1 :m. Sec /Jill on Hard New rite, supra not<• 2 ("Spveral stall's supd tlw Bush 
administration over the law in the last deeadP. 1msuccc•ssfully."). 
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NCLB was unconstitutionally ambiguous. 140 But state lawsuits 
are not usually so successful. For example, Arizona attempted 
to challenge the DOE's decisions regarding students with 
limited English proficiency, but the case was dismissed for lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction. 141 Similarly, when Connecticut 
sued the Secretary of Education-alleging that the Secretary 
violated the Administrative Procedures Act by rejecting the 
state's amendments to its educational plan 142-a district court 
upheld the Secretary's actions as not arbitrary and 
capricious. 143 
Scholars perennially forecast that reauthorization of NCLB 
will finally vindicate state protests, 144 but legislation is simply 
a poor mechanism for an issue-like education-that needs 
periodic updating to reflect new research on improving 
educational achievement. Recently, prominent NCLB advocate, 
and former Assistant Secretary of Education, Diane Ravitch, 
turned heads by reversing course on most of NCLB's core 
principles. 145 She has become particularly opposed to using 
competition to improve schools and standardized testing146-
core components of NCLB that the current administration has 
proposed retaining and even increasing. 147 She cites studies 
concluding that NCLB is not increasing student achievement 
and criticizes the approach of "measuring and punishing" as 
prompting excess cheating by local districts. 14x She also notes 
110. S!'!' Sch. Dist. Pontiac v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Educ., 581 F.ad 25:1, 277 (6th 
Cir. 2009) ("lAJ state official deciding to participate in NCLB reasonably could read § 
7907(a) to mean that the State need not comply with requiremPnts that are 'not paid 
for under the Act' with federal funds."). 
111. See Ariz. State Dep't of Educ. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 2007 WL 1:3:3581 (D. Ariz. 
2007) (dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
112. Connecticut v. Spellings, 519 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Conn. 200H). 
11:3. See id. at Jill. 
111. See, e.g., Michael Heise, The 2006' Winthrop and Frances Lane Lecture: The 
Unintended Lef{al and l'olicy Consequences of the No Child Left Behind Act, 86 NEB. L. 
REV. 119, 12:3-25 (2007) (discussing how state lawsuits had not been effective but 
noting that political prospectives in 2007 looked promising). Professor Heise noted that 
while "lawsuits [challenging NCLB] have not been especially effective. On the political 
front, however, the prospects for influencing NCLB appear more promising. That 
NCLB is due for reauthorization in 2007 highlights the potential for change." !d. 
115. Sec Sam Dillon, Scholar's School Reform U-Turn Shahes Up Debate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. :l, 2010, at A 1 :l [hereinafter Dillon U-Turnj, auailable at 
http;/ /www. nytim es.com/20 1 0/0:l/O:ll ed uca tion/O:lravitch. h tml?pagewan ted"'a II 
(describing Diane i{<lVitch's renunciation of many of the policies she once' promoted). 
116. /d. 
117. Dillon Chanf{cs, supra note 68. 
11H. Steve Inskeep, Former 'No Child Left Behind' Aduocate Turns Critic, NPR 
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that many states have lowered their standards to ensure 
compliance with federal guidelines. 149 
The studies Ravitch cites, however, date back to 2006. More 
than four years have passed and a failing law has not been 
changed. 150 The reason is simple: NCLB is politically charged 
and the bipartisan support that existed for the 2001 
reauthorization has disappeared. 151 Congress is increasingly 
hostile to bipartisan efforts, to the detriment of a school system 
in need of reform. By contrast, greater delegation to 
independent agencies could create a more-f1exible regime. So in 
reauthorizing NCLB, Congress should permit the DOE, in 
coordination with the states, to set core guidelines for teacher 
qualification, consequences for inadequate schools, and the 
standard for measuring progress. 
B. The Promise of Administrative T~aw for Improving NCLB 
Instead of merely renaming the existing standards and 
making minor changes to teacher qualifications and 
consequences for failing to meet NCLB's requirements, 152 
Congress should simply set the broader objectives of national 
education policy and let one or more administrative agencies 
fill in the rest of the details. 153 As an example, Congress could 
set the broad objective of "having qualified teachers," and allow 
an independent federal agency, in consultation with states, to 
set any further details of this objective. This approach not only 
allows for ongoing state participation in modifying the NCLB 
scheme, but it also promotes greater state participation in 
creating the specific policies that compnse NCLB 
reauthorization itself. 
(Mar. 1-1 2010), !Wailahle 
transcript .php'lstoryld=1212091 00. 
1 HJ. /d. 
150. /d. 
at http://www. npr.org/ll•mplnt es/transcri pt/ 
1 :) 1. /hi/on Hard llczorite. supra nott• 2 ("In 2001. wlwn Congn•ss compll'tt•d tlw 
law's most n·cpnt. n•writl'. the dfor·t took a full Yl'ar, and tfw bipartisan const·nsus that 
made that possible has long sincl' shattered."). 
152. See supra Part ll.IJ and tH'compnn,·ing ll'xt. 
15:l. The Sl'lTetary of Education has gl'IWI'nllv advocatl·d a similar app1·oach of 
congn•ssionally-set brond standards. with loose definitions of whnt nwt'ls thost• 
standards. Sec Anw Duncan, lh•authoriz<Ition of I•:SEA Whv Wl' Can't Wait.. i{l'markH 
at the Monthly St.ak<d1olders Ml•Pting (Sept. 21, 20mJ). rwailahle at 
http://www2.l'd.gov/rwws/s]wechl•s/2009/09/092·12009.ht.ml ("[W]<' should hl· tight on thL• 
goals-with clcilr standards sd by statr>s that truly prepan: young pl'oplt• l(n· collegL' 
and can•t•rs-but Wl' should be loose on tlw Inl'ans for nwl'ling those goals"). 
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Such a task could fall to the DOE; the Secretary of 
Education is already working on drafting new proposals for 
reauthorization of NCLB. 154 Moreover, the DOE already 
administers NCLB-issuing policy guidance and disciplining 
states for noncompliance. 155 Scholars suggest that NCLB would 
improve if the DOE simply offered more policy guidance. 156 
Congress should go a step further, wiping the slate clean and 
instructing the DOE-in coordination with state 
governments-to create the specific guidelines for achieving 
broad educational goals through informal rulemaking. 157 This 
approach would not necessarily require modifying the 
prohibition against the DOE setting curriculum, since the 
DOE-as Congress did with NCLB-could set only assessment 
criteria and allow states to set the actual content of school 
curriculum. 15 x 
One of the primary weaknesses of this approach is that it 
relies on Congress limiting its own role m setting the 
151. Sec Dillon C:han{;es, supra note 68 ("lThe Secretary of Education] has been 
working behind the scenes on rewriting the No Child law with a bipartisan h'TOUp of 
senior lawmakers in both chambers"); Sam Dillon, No-Child Law is a Highlight of 
Hearin{I on l~dumtion, N.Y. TIMEH, Mar. 1, 2010, at i\20 [hereinafter Dillon Hcarin{I], 
available at http://www .nytimes.com/20 1 O/O:l/01/education/01educ.h tml (describing 
how Congress questioned the Secretary of Education on the prospects of 
reauthorization). 
155. MANNA, supra note 29, at 1 :l1-:i5 (describing how !'resident Bush and the 
Secretary of Education praised states and issued policy revisions when states wen' 
failing to meet requirements under the Act, in order to maintain the ability to pursue 
thl,ir agenda); Thomas & Brady, supra notl' 61, at 61 (describing situations where the 
Department of l~ducation has penalized states financially for failing to meet NCLB 
n'quin•ments). 
156. See Pinder, supra note 10, at 17 ("Many states do not have the capacity to 
implement the supplemental services requirements for schools identified as 'failing,' 
the highly qualified teacher provisions or thl' standards and assessments required 
under the Adequate Yearly l'rogn,ss (i\Yl') provision; moreover, there is a dearth of 
receiving schools to which students may transfer if their current school fails to meet 
i\ Yl' standards, and {Iuidancc (rom the Department is insufficient." (emphasis added)). 
157. The n'quin,ml,nts for informal rulcmaking arc described in the AI' A. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 55:l (196G). Basic requirements include publishing "general notice of proposed rule 
making ... in the Federal l{egister." /d. at ~ 55:l(b). Additionally, "after notice ... the 
agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making 
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity 
for oral presentation." /d. at ~ 55:3(c). Then, the agency must consider the "relevant 
matter presented" and "incorporate in the rull's adopted a concise general statement of 
their basis and purpose." /d. The final rule is published at least 30 days before its 
effective date and an "interested person" has "the right to petition for the issuance, 
amendment, or repeal of a rule." /d. at~ 55:3(d)-(e). Of course, Congress is free to tailor 
these requirements in regard to any particular statutory scheme. 
158. See Pinder, supra note 10, at 15-lG (discussing the limitations of DOE's 
enabling act). 
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particulars of education policy. But there are persuasive 
reasons that Congress should consider doing so. Since an 
agency will set the details of new policies, there is less 
potential for the partisan gridlock that derided past 
reauthorization efl'orts. 159 For Republicans, and even the Tea 
Party, states' rights are a key concern, and this approach 
encourages greater state participation in setting education 
policy. For Democrats, this approach ensures that the federal 
government will have a key role in setting objectives for 
education policy. Perhaps most importantly, for both parties, 
this approach sets the stage for the future success of federal 
and state relations regarding education policy. By moving the 
ongoing debate about education policy to a more responsive and 
flexible body, members of Congress can assure constituents 
that strides are being made in education policy, without having 
to shoulder the criticisms of again making multiple missteps 
due to political compromise. 
This proposal also might be challenged as unconstitutional. 
States could argue that, if they are forced to accept federal 
funds before they know the specific rules the DOE will 
eventually promulgate, the rule is too ambiguous. 1('0 Indeed, 
courts have been conflicted over whether to permit agencies to 
fi1l in the details of federal spending-clause legislation, though 
mainly when an agency issues guidance with a congressional 
mandate. 161 Congress could require that new DOE regulations 
remain nonbinding until the next installment of federal funds, 
allowing states to accept unambiguous terms when accepting 
funds. 162 Congress also could preempt these arguments by 
unambiguously notifying states that the DOE is entrusted with 
159. See /)ilion Hard Ucwrite, supnt note• ~ (di'C:ll~~ing th<' partisan gridlock that 
stopped p1·ior d'forts at reauthorization). 
](iO. South Dakota v. llole. 1H:l U.S. 20:l, 207 (1 ~JH7) ("IWie hav(' requin•d that if 
Congr<'ss desin•s to condition tlw States' re<·<•ipt of f<·<kral fllnds, it. 'mll~t do so 
unambiguous!~- ... , <:nabl[ingj tlw Statc·s to <'Xt:rcisc: tlwir choi<'<' knowingly-, cogniwnt 
of the cons.,quPnces of tlwir participation."' (quoting l'<:nnhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. 
Hald<•rrmm, •15 1 U.S. 1. 17 and n. J:l (1 ~JH 1 )). 
Hi1. David F. Engstrom, /Jmwing Unes /Jetuwcn Chevron und l'ennhurst: A 
Functional Analysis of the Spending !'ower, Fedcrolisrn, and the Arhninistmtiue Stole, 
H~ 'l'!<:x. L. l{i•:V. 11 ~J7, 1 ~12-11 (20tH) (discussing Va. lkp't. of Educ. v. llil<•y, 1 Oli F.:ld 
;)59 (1th Cir. 1 ml7) (('n bane) (per curiam)). In Va. Dl']/t of !•;due. v. llil<·v. the Fourth 
Circuit prohibitl·d J)()J•: intcrprl'taLions of the IDEA to trump Virginia's int<•rprl'tation. 
/d. HL 1212. HowPver, Congn:ss had not ('Xplicitly- l'nLJ·u~tc·d tlw agl'ncy with cn•ating 
L}](' details of tlw n:gulation. /d. at 1212-1 :L 
162. Peter .J. Smith, l'cnnhurst, Clwvron, and the Spending l'ou•ror, 110 Y.\L!o: L .. J. 
11 H7, 12:l5-:lf) (2001) (discussing pros and cons of' such an approach). 
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interpreting the broad conditions set by Congress. 163 States 
might also argue that this approach is an unconstitutional 
delegation of congressional regulatory authority. But 
delegation is permissible as long as Congress gives an 
"intelligible principle" to guide agency rulemaking. 164 The 
Supreme Court, unwilling to second guess most delegations, 
has interpreted "intelligible principle" very broadly, 165 
upholding even a delegation that simply required regulations 
"in the public interest." 166 In fact, only two statutes have ever 
violated this rule, both of which gave little or no guidance. 167 
As long as Congress sets some broad educational goals-such 
as a general standard that schools hire qualified, effective 
teachers-then the delegation would probably be 
constitutionally permissible. 
This proposal-using administrative law to give states a 
more prominent voice in setting federal education policy-
encapsulates the emerging theories of federalism discussed 
previously. In regards to the proposition that federalism is 
obsolete, the administrative state offers a chance to rewrite the 
structural elements of government. The national priorities for 
education are still promulgated through federal agencies, 
thereby accounting for the United States' uniform normative 
16:l. S!'c id. at 1210. It would be a close question whether such an approach would 
bl' constitutional. Reviewing precedent, Petl>r Smith notes: "It would not be 
unreasonable to conclude, in light of general contract principles and the interests that 
Chevron serves, that states should (absent thl' Bowen retroactivity problems described 
ahovl') hl' hound even by agency interpretations that postdate the state's acceptance of 
funds. Ell,ml,ntal notions of fairness for the state recipients give pause, however, 
especially when one considers the hypotheticals of the agency's reversing its prior view 
or the state's committing the grant funds in reliance on its own reasonable view, only 
to learn later that the agency has a different (albeit reasonable) view. . . . [T]he 
question is ... a close one." !d. 
161. See Mistretta v. United States, 188 U.S. :l61, :n2 (1989) (''So long as Congress 
'shall lay down by legislatiVl' act an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative 
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislatiVl' power."' (quoting .J.W. Hampton, Jr., 
& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. :l91, 109 (1928))). 
165. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 5:11 U.S. 157, 17a (20(l1) (giving 
examples of permissible intPlligible principles). 
166. /d. at 171 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
167. !d. at 171 ("'n the history of the Court we have found the requisitl' 'intelligible 
principle' lacking in only two statutes, one of which provided literally no guidance for 
the exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the 
entire economy on thl' basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the 
economy by assuring 'fair competition."' (citing Pan. J{ef. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. :388 
(19:l5); AL.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935))). 
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desire for better elementary and secondary education. 1('K 
Additionally, it permits regional or state experimentation until 
a more cohesive national ideal is identified. 1c,9 In regards to 
empowerment and polyphonic federalism, the whole objective 
of this approach is to further empower states while not 
diminishing federal power, actually adding further players-
independent agencies-into the group of entities seeking to 
solve educational deficiencies. 170 By empowering agencies to 
set the specifics of federal education policy, the federal 
government would appropriately set a stage for a dynamic 
ongoing debate over education policy. This debate would allow 
the federal and state governments to learn from each other 171 
without the crippling necessity of cumbersome congressional 
action to dramatically change course. 172 
C. Administrative Law Mechanisms for Increasing Polyphony 
If Congress does increase the role of the DOE in setting 
education policy, it is important for Congress to provide tools 
for the agency to perform this task in a way that increases 
state participation in setting national education policy. m This 
article now proposes a senes of administrative-law 
mechanisms that Congress could use to promote this 
participation. 
D. Notice-and-comment rulemahing 
Congress could enact a modified version of notice-and-
comment rulemaking to specifically address state concerns. 174 
lf1K FEI·:LEY & IWBIN. supra notl' G, at 11:, (discussing how "tlw Anwrican pl•opll' 
... havl' a unifit•d political ilkntit.v."). 
1G9. !d. at 117 ("[SJtate divl'rgem·l' from national norms, whilt• it may· prl'vail 
during pt•riods of nonnatiw unct•rtainty. it ttltimatt•ly suppn•ssed once t.he national 
position lwconws clear."). 
170. See Schapiro. supm not" 7. at 2!i·1 ("JFJl'dl•ralism is about t.lw inlt•raction of 
multiple indl'Jll'l1dl'nt voices."). 
171. See id. at 10:l ("NCLll should allow stal<·s to learn from t•ach otht·r and from 
the national govprnml·nf'). l'rof(•ssor Schapiro nott•s that "[tjlw national governnwnt 
also can build on the hl'sl. prncticPs of the states." !d. 
172. Sec supra notes 1 S5-H7 and accompanying !.t•xt (discussing how agt·ncit•s can 
take action l'asier than Congn•ss). 
17:l. 8ee l'indL·r. Sllpru note 10. at 15 (arguing that it was a fallacy to n•quin· !)()!<; 
to l'nforcc NCLB curriculum standards without giving any "n•al guidant•t• about how to 
dfl'ctivtdy t•nfmct• those provisions."). 
171. l'rofPssor Ml'tzgcr suggl•sl.s that courts could achil'Vl' this goal bv "polic[ingJ 
t.ht• distinction lll'twel'n lt•gislativt• and nonkgislative rul"s tightly, insisting on notit·t•-
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This would allow the federal government to consult with states 
on national education policy. 175 Congress could require 
agencies to hold special notice-and-comment periods just for 
the states. 176 The DOE thus could avoid opening the issue up to 
the whole public, while still addressing state concerns. This 
procedure would be ideal for allowing states to participate in 
setting the details of a reauthorized NCLB and also for 
responding to state concerns in ongoing modifications of NCLB. 
Moreover, by opening notice-and-comment procedure to local 
governments or school districts as well, this approach would 
refute the assertion that federal education policy silences the 
voices of local governments. 177 Of course, like normal 
administrative rulemaking, the federal government could still 
drive the policy, since the final rule would need to be a "logical 
outgrowth" of the originally proposed rule. 17X The DOE would 
not have to side with the majority of states but would have to 
explain its reasoning, 179 creating greater responsiveness than 
currently realized through congressional process. 
One criticism might be that burdensome procedures for 
participating in agency rulemaking could stifle reform. 1 ~0 But 
and-comment procedures whenever an agency interpretive rule or policy statement had 
significant legal or practical effect on a state." Metzger, supra note 122, at 21 02-0::l. She 
also suggests that "[a]lternatively, courts could strictly enforce notice and explanation 
requirements, requiring that fedl,ral agencies carefully identify and justify the 
pn'l'mptive or other dfects of a proposed rule on tlw states." !d. at 21 O:l. 
17:). See, e.g, Susan H. Fuhrman, tess than Meets the /<;ye: Standards, Testin;;, 
and Fear of Federal Control, in WHo's IN CHt\J{(;J<: IIEJU(I THE TANGLJW WEB OF 
SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 1 fi:l (Noel Epstein ed., 2001) (recommending that 
"[sjtate and local policymakl,rs and educators should hl' consulted as part of the 
development procl,ss" for federal policies). 
176. Since notice and comment procedures are statutorily created, Con!-,'Tess can 
create special procedun•s f(>r particular statutory n'giml,s. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2000) 
(creating special notice and comment procedures for Securities and Exchange 
Commission review of Financial Industry f{cgulatory Authority rules). Research did 
not find any current special notice and comment procedures for state participation. 
177. llcisc, supra note 11, at 1 :ll ("[T]hc education sector evidences a consistent 
desire to decentralize educational policy-making authority, especially as it relates to 
cllomentary and Sl'condary education."). 
178. Natural Hes. Def. Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 110, 1:l7 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(applying thl' logical outgrowth t.l,st). 
179. Motor Vehiele Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 16:-l U.S. 29, 1:1 
(198:-l) (dPeiding an "agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts 
found and thl~ choice madt~.'" (quoting Burlington Truck Lim~s v. United States, ::n1 
U.S.156, 168(1962))). 
180. Sec Sidm•y A. Shapiro & J{ichard W. Murphy, l~if{ht Thin;;s Americans Can't 
Fi;;ure Out About Controllin;; Administrative Power, 61 AllMIN. L. HEV. 5, 8 (2009) 
("Judicial efforts to make notice-and-comment meaningful have made this process very 
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this procedure would be more flexible than formal rulemaking 
or Congressional action, 1 ~ 1 especially for issues with the 
potential for partisan gridlock. 1 x2 A federal bill must garner the 
approval of both congressional houses and the President before 
becoming law. 1 ~J Requiring two governmental branches to alter 
the law-or three if it is challenged in court-promotes 
stability and hinders change. 1 x4 Agency rulemaking, on the 
other hand, moves much quicker. 1 xs Too much f1uidity can, of 
course, create a lack of clarity, but this approach would 
actually promote clarity by providing a much-needed 
mechanism for quickly modifying unclear or otherwise 
inadequate rules. 
E. Judicial review of agency decisions 
Allowing agencies to create specific guidelines for NCLB 
would also increase judicial review of NCL13 regulations. 
Although courts are highly deferential to agency decisions, 1 X6 
the APA imposes a standard of judicial review that is stricter 
than constitutional constraints alone. 1 X? Courts evaluate 
burdt'nsoTne, IPading, according to n1any critics, to thl' notorious 'ossification' of agPlH.'Y 
ndt>making ... "). 
Jill. See Lars No;d1. !Jiuining Hcgu!at.ory Intent: The !'lace for a "/,egislutirJC 
History" of' Agency Hules. f>l IL\S'I'IN<:S L .• J. 2ii:), 2~Hi (2000) (discussing "thl• n•lat.ivl' 
ease of amt>nding a regulation through inf(>nnal ruh•making procedun·s. at lt'ast :~s 
compared to tlw inertia and other difficultil•s l'ncountered hy Congn•ss"): Nicholas S. 
hl,ppos. !Jej(•r-crl<'e to l'oliticul /)ccisiorunul!crs and the l're/('rrcd Scope o/ .Judicial 
/leuiew. 88 Nw. U. L. Ht•;v. 296, :;2:-; ( nm:l) (suggesting agl,ncies can make fl·deral law 
easi1•r than Congn•ss): Notes. '/'he .Judicial Hole in /Jef'ining l'roceduml Hequirements 
jfn Agency Hulemaliing. Wi lli\IN. L. l{t•;v. 782. 7i:\ii (1971) ('Tlw n·latiw advantagr·s of 
dficil•ncy, flexibility. and broad participation makt' infonnal rulemaking po·eferahle to 
formal adjudication or formal rulL•making as a nwans of dl•vvloping lvgisi<ttiw facts 
and thereby fot'mulat.ing administrative policivs."). 
11l2. Sec f)illon IAW'suit, supra note :1 (discussing how Cong-n•ss was "stymied h\· 
partisan strifl• oVl'r the [NCLBJ's l'l'lll'Wal"). 
18:L Zc·ppos. supra not.<• 1 H 1, at. :\~H. 
18·1. Cass It SunsLl•in. Constitutionalism J\j)er the Neu' /Jeul. 101 IL\HV. L. Rt•:v. 
!J21. 't:Hi (1987). 
180>. Sec i:eppos. supra note Jill. at :\28 ("While tlH• l\I'A-mon• :t<·curately. an 
i\1'1\ vigorously intl•rpret.ed by the judiciary~·n•at.l's barril'I"S to agenc:-· action, agency 
action need not go through tlw sanw cumbersonw procl•ss as a bill (bicam(•ralism and 
pn:sentment) to IH•come htw."). 
18ti. Sec Chevron. U.S.A .. Inc. v. Natural J{,•s. Dl.f'. Council. Inc., Hi7 U.S. s:n. 811-
lii (19tl1) (using a two-step test to dl'cidl· whl'thl'r to def<'r to <tdministr<tt.iVl' agl'ncv 
interpretations of law). 
li:\7. Sec fi U.S.C. ~ 70ti(2)(A) (reqniring courts to "hold nnlawfnl and s1·t asid,. 
agPncy action. findings. and conclusions found to b1•-arbitrary. capricious. an abuse of' 
discretion. or otlwrwisl' not in <tccon!anc<> with law"). 
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whether agency decisions are reasonable 1 xx and not "arbitrary 
or capricious." 1 X') In some cases, courts even examine whether 
an agency made a rational connection between the facts and its 
decision. 190 
Although often unsuccessful, alleging improper agency 
action is currently one of the main ways states can oppose 
NCLB. If the DOE was given more discretion, it would be 
easier for states to usc this approach to oppose education 
policies. Rather than mounting a constitutional challenge, 
states could challenge DOE decisions as arbitrary and 
capricious. This burden is tough to meet but would provide an 
outer boundary on the DOE's discretion in setting education 
policy. Congress could even require the DOE to support its 
decisions with "substantial evidence." Either way, judicial 
review of state complaints increases polyphony between state 
and federal government because it increases the state voice in 
setting NCLB regulations. To avoid overburdening the courts-
and to allow the DOE to control the agenda-Congress could 
limit the right of action to bring suit to state governments. 
There are critics, however, of an expanded judicial role. 
Much of this criticism is directed at proposals for the Supreme 
Court to find that NCLB violates the spending power. 191 The 
author agrees that this approach is unfavorable: it might 
severely limit the voice of the federal government, decreasing 
polyphony even in areas beyond education. 192 Moreover, the 
1HH. Chcuron, c167 U.S. at H1cl-c15. 
1H9. Sec Motor Vt;hicle Mfrs. i\ss'n v. State l•'arm Mut. i\uto. Ins. Co., 16:l U.S. 29, 
1:1 (198:1) (applying the i\1' 1\'s arbitrary and capricious review provision). 
190. !d. at 1:1 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, :l71 U.S. 156, 168 
(1962)). 
191. Compare Coulter M. Bump, Comment, Reuiuing the Coercion Test: A l'roposal 
to l'reuent Federal Conditional Spending That /,caucs Children Behind, 76 U. COLO. L. 
Rr:v. 521 (2005) (arguing the Court should revive a stricter analysis of ft;deral coercion 
in order to limit NCLB), and Gina i\ustin, Note, Leaving Federalism Behind: How the 
No Child Left Behind Act Usurps States' Rights, 27 T. ,JEFFEI{SON L. Rt:V. :5:37, :156 
(2005) (arguing that NCLB "is inherently vagm; and ambiguous."), with Consiglio, 
supra note 129, at :l69 (criticizing the unconstitutionality aq.,'l.mwnt and those like it 
ht•cause "[tjhey do not point the way forward to correcting the long intractable problem 
of im;quality in educational opportunities, hut insist that the flexibility and freedom 
schools have enjoyed for decades is still the solution."). 
192. Two examples of spending clause h;gislation include federal 
antidiscrimination and child welfan• statutes. See i\nn Carey Juliano, The More You 
Spend, the More You Saue: Can the Spending Clause Saue Federal Anti-Discrimination 
/,aws~. 16 VILL. L. Ri•:v. 1111, 116:1 (2001) ("Two prime examples of anti-discrimination 
Spending Clause k•gislation are Title VI and Title IX."); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, 
Uefrarning the /Jebate about the Socialization of Children: An l~nvironrnentalist 
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federal government took control of education policy because 
local control, by itself, had proved inadequate to improve 
national academic achievement. 19-' The proposal here avoids 
these pitfalls by not requiring courts to make wide-sweeping 
decisions about the scope of the Spending Clause just to strike 
down an arbitrary education policy. 
F. Political accountability 
Agencies may be even more accountable to the American 
public than Congress is, for primarily four reasons. 194 First, 
agencies are more open to participation by low-budget 
lobbies. 195 Second, they can respond more quickly to public 
opinion. 196 Third, they have regional offices with staffers who 
live and work in local communities, giving them a better gauge 
of on-the-ground concerns than lawmakers in Washington. 197 
Finally, agencies arc subjected to presidential appointment and 
removal, 19x and presidential influence impresses state concerns 
on agencies because of the important role state officials play in 
presidential campaigns. 199 As evidence of this phenomenon, 
since President Reagan, every president has "issued or at least 
maintained an executive order requiring agencies specifically 
to consider state and local government concerns when 
regulating.•@() 
l'urudigm, ~001 U. Ciil. LJ•:t:,\L F. i-\5. 1 ~() n.l ()9 ("Child wcdf'an• law providc>s manv 
c>xamples of s]wnding clause nwasures, including Llw Adoption Assist:uH:<• and Child 
Welfan· Act .... "). 
J9:l. See Consiglio, supra note• 1~9, at :lf19 (arguing that to invalidate f('d<•ral 
involvement in c>ducation polici<•s fails hc>cansP it dot•s not point t lw wa~; f(nwanl, but 
relies on same> mechanisms that did not. work lwf(n·<·). 
Hl·1. See Brian Callt' & Mark Sc:id('nf<·ld, Administmlil'e l~wc's l•l·derulism: 
l'rcemption, /)e/cgation, and Agencies at the !~dge of Fcderall'ou•cr. ii7 Dllt<J<: L .• J. 19:l:l, 
1979 (:lOOK) (analyzing tlw rPlative political accountability of legislatiVl', judicial. and 
agency ]Jl'OCCSSl'S). 
195. !d. at 19fi0, 191-\~. 
19G. Id. 
197. Sec Ml'lzg<•r, supm nott• 1 ~~- at ~07•1-7ii (discussing t lw proximity of regional 
agenc~· offices to tlw stat"s as a rc>ason that agt•nciPs an• good cntitit•s to addn·ss 
fc•dc>ralism concerns). 
191-\. See U.S. CO:-.JST. art. II.~~. cl. ~ (recjttiring tlw l'rcsicb1t to appoint inf(•rior 
officc>rs): Myers v. Unitt•d StaLPs. ~~~ U.S. !'i~ (19~()) (holding that tlw l'rc>sidc•nt has 
power to l'emove executive branch officials, l'Vl'll though Llw Constitution dot•s not 
Pxplicitly address n•moval). 
199. Sec Galll' & SPicknfl'ld. suprrt note 19·1. at HlH:l (making this argunwnt 
regarding pn'sidential influence on agc,ncit•s). 
200. lei. at HlH:l n.210 (citing P.g., Ex('l:. Ord<•r No. l:l,l:l~. :l C.F.Il. ~0(1 (2000), 
reprinted in ii U.S.C. ~ ()01 (200fi): Ext•c·. ()l'([pr No. 12,:!72, 17 1<\•d. llc•g. :l0.9ii~) (,Julv 
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Allowing and tracking state experimentation 
Another benefit of using administrative law and 
independent agencies as the vehicle for reforming NCLB is the 
potential for the reauthorization to take greater account of 
diverse state education initiatives. As noted, Congress already 
requires the DOE to account for some state experimentation by 
allowing for state waivers.201 Additionally, the DOE 1s 
responsible for writing policy letters to the states and 
monitoring state compliance.202 These factors make the DOE 
more aware of the state concerns about education policy. The 
DOE will be-and already is-counseling Congress about the 
reauthorization of NCLB,2°3 but the agency should be the 
conduit for setting many of the standards for the new law. 
The DOE should be encouraged to embrace experimentation 
in state policy and be given leeway to do so. 204 This could take 
the form of waivers. 205 For example, the DOE could grant a 
state a waiver for students who are not at risk in exchange for 
increased accountability in regard to disadvantaged 
students.206 Waivers are, of course, criticized for diluting 
accountability by allowing states to avoid consequences, 207 and 
they are only a temporary remedy to the broader problem of 
11. 1982)). 
201. 20 U.S.C. ~ 7861 (2002). According to NCLB: '"Except as provided in 
subsection (c) of this section, the Secretary [of Educationj may waive any statutory or 
regulatory requirenwnt of this chapter for a State educational agency, local educational 
agency, Indian tribe, or school through a local educational agency, that-(1) receives 
funds undPr a program authorized by this chapter; and (2) requests a waiver under 
subsection (b) of this sl;ction." !d. at~ 7861 (a). 
202. See NCLB l'olicy Letters to States, ED.nov, www2.ed.gov/policy 
/elsec/guid/statl;ldters/index.html (last modified Apr. 21, 2009) (listing DO!~ policy 
letters to states and showcases approved state accountability plans). 
20:1. Dillon Hearing, supra notl' 1 fi![ (discussing a congressional hearing where the 
Secretary of Education briefly discussed the planned reauthorization of NCLB). 
201. See Consiglio, supra note 129, at :l70 (noting that "the Bush administration's 
refusal to engage in any substantive negotiation with states requesting waivers of 
certain provisions of NCLB sent a chilling messagl' that was counterproductive to 
NCLB's goals."). 
20fi. Cf. Matthew D. Knepper, Comment, Shooting for the Moon: The Innocence of 
the No Child Left /3ehind Act's One Hundred Percent Proficiency Goal and Its 
Consequences, fi:l ST. LOUIS U. L .• J. H99, 92:l (2009) (noting that "since NCLB's 
inception, the Secretary has been anything hut willing to grant such waivers."). 
206. Mauricl~ !{. Dyson, De Facto Segregation & Group nlindness: l'roposals for 
Narrow Tailoring under a New Viable State Interest In Pies v. Seattle School District, 
77 UMKC L. i{EV. 697, 7:l:l (2009). 
207. See, e.g., Pinder, supra note 10, at :l5 ('"[MJany states have used loopholes and 
waivers to dilute the impact of NCLB's accountability provisions."). 
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states being excluded from participating in setting national 
education policy.20x Many of the proposals discussed elsewhere 
in this article will help eliminate the risk that the new law will 
be watered-down through too many waivers. 
Congress also could address another key concern of NCLB 
critics-states lowering their standards-simply by granting 
the DOE more discretion regarding state educational plans. 
The Secretary of Education already subjects state standards to 
peer and agency review,209 but the Secretary's authority to 
deny approval of state plans is so limited that it is 
ineffective. 210 The Secretary cannot put conditions on its 
approval of the plan, so the DOE can't specify any particular 
academic assessment or require the state to add to or remove 
any part of their plan. 211 By giving the DO I<: greater discretion 
to reject inadequate plans, Congress would increase states' 
incentive to enact better plans. In the language of federal 
theory, standard setting has become too state-driven; greater 
discretion for the DOE would increase polyphony, just as giving 
states a greater voice in setting core NCLB regulations would 
increase the polyphony of that process. 
G. Transparency in rulemaking 
An additional benefit of using agencies to formulate more 
specific guidelines of NCLB is that agency rulemaking, 
especially under the regime of the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), is likely more transparent than the legislative 
process. 212 FOTA, part of the APA, requires agencies to provide 
a wide variety of documents to the public. 211 Even apart from 
FOIA, because they face judicial review for "arbitrary and 
capncwus" decisions, agencies have a greater incentive than 
201-i. Do;m, supm noll• i\2, at 227. 
209. 20 U.S.C. ~ ();l] 1(P)(l) (21)(H)). According to tlw statuks. tlw i'lP<'l'l'lar:--· shall: 
"(/\) establish a pl'l'r-rPviPw pmn•ss to assist in tlw n·view of StaLl• plans: (ll) appoint 
individuals to the ]JPPr-rcviPw process who are n•pn•sl'nt.ativl' of parl'nts. ll'achl'rs. 
State- l'ducational agc•nci<•s, an<l local Pducational agPncil's, and who an· familiar with 
educational standards, assessnwnts, accountability. the lH'l'ds of low-p<•rforming 
schools. and otlwr l'ducational nl'<,ds of stud<•nt s . 
210. /d. 
211. !d. at~ 6:n 1(<·)(1)(F). 
212. Sec Calle• & Sc•idc•nfeld, supra noll' Hll, at 19:)1\ ("!Tilw ag<•ncy proc<·,.;s likely 
is more transpan•nt than tlw ll'gislativ<· pro<·<·ss primarily IH'caus" tlw costs of gaining 
access to agpncy staff nwmlwrs who can Pxplain tlw agency's dPiih<•rations is lowpr 
than tht• co,.;t to gain acct•ss to h•gislators.''). 
21:l. G LJ.S.C. ~ GG2 (2009). 
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Congress to explain the rationale behind their decision-
making.214 Agencies do not have the same incentive as 
Congress to use opacity as a shield against dissatisfied 
voters. 215 
Moreover, it is, as a rule, less expensive to gain access to 
agency staffers than federal legislators. 216 Cash-strapped state 
lobbies217 have greater potential for participation in agency 
rulemaking than through costly efforts to influence 
Congress. 21 x And because agencies have a greater incentive to 
explain their rationales, state lobbies can be better informed.219 
For this reason, agencies are likely the most effective federal 
vehicle for ensuring that states have access to influence and 
understand the rationales behind new NCLB regulations, 
rather than just having to deal with the outcomes.220 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that NCLB needs to be reformed. The federal 
government is often unresponsive to state concerns, so the 
states have resorted to lowering their standards to comply with 
the law. Congress has been exceedingly slow to respond to the 
evidence that some parts of NCLB are not working, despite the 
fact that there remain many questions about how the law 
211. Sec Galk· & S,;idenf,,Jd, supra note 191, at 1960 ("[Ajg,;ncy staff members 
facing hard look judicial revi,;w must know all the potential objections to a rule the 
agency is proposing and obtain as much information about those objections as possible 
to facilitate the defense of any rule if it is challenged in court."). 
21 fi. Sec id. (touching on this aspect of agency transparPncy). 
216. /cl.at19fiH. 
217. States inde,;d are facing seven; financial difficulties. See Amy Merrick, States 
Sink m Dcncfits Hole, WALL ST. .)., Feb. 18, 2010, available at 
http://onlim•. wsj.com/artide/SB I 000112105271H701:l9HH01fi7G071 H7:lG17:l72fi 11.html 
(discussing a i'Pw CentPr on tlw States study that showed status were facing extreme 
financial burdens from their promis,;d employment benefits). 
218. Sec Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David 
Schocnbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 7i-11 (1999) (contrasting the costs of participating 
in agency rulemaking with influpncing congrPssional d(;cisionmaking). 
219. See Calle & Seidenfdd, supra note 191, at 1961 (arguing that in regards to 
transpan;ncy, "agencies outperform thPir rivals, as they offer more sourcps of insight 
about their ,jpcisionmaking as well as information about how to inlluenc(; it''). 
220. Sec id. ("[Ajlthough the public may be more awan; of statutes or Suprcm(; 
Court dPcisions than of ohscun; f,•dcral regulations, true transparency entails not only 
knowledge of outcomes hut also knowledg'~ of the rationales on which decisionmakers 
rely and the ability to influence the decision maker's deliberations."). Scholars note that 
in regards to transpan;ncy "agencies outperform their rivals, as they offer more sources 
of insight about their dPcisionmaking as well as information about how to inlluenn; it." 
!d. 
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should balance the state and federal roles in setting education 
policy. 
Emerging theories of federalism arc helpful in the task of 
re-imagining NCLB and should inform Congress in the 
reauthorization. These theories support a strong federal role in 
education. But they also promote greater empowerment of 
state governments, allowing coordination and competition 
between both levels of government, for the sake of the nation's 
education. With this theoretical underpinning, the role of 
Congress is to look for ways to promote federal and state 
polyphony in setting education law. 
The best way to achieve this balance-to maintain federal 
control and increase the voice of the states-is to delegate more 
responsibility to federal agencies, while enacting special 
mechanisms meant to increase the voice of the states. Congress 
should a1low federal agencies to set many of the specifics of 
NCLB's reauthorization, while also allowing for easier judicial 
review for state challenges to agency decisions, special notice-
and-comment procedures for states, and procedures for 
encouraging state experimentation. Using agencies and these 
mechanisms, Congress can ensure that the next 
reauthorization of NCLB remains flexible enough to address 
ongoing concerns and promotes the empowerment of states. 
Future scholarship and research should continue to explore 
additional ways Congress can usc administrative law to 
improve federal and state interaction in setting education 
policy and beyond. 
